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LEGISLATION
Conditions in Government Contracts-The Walsh-Healey Act
Characterized by some as a "back-door NRA",1 the Walsh-Healey Act 2
prescribes basic standards of labor as conditions in government contracts for
materials and supplies. Although the stimulus to the enactment of this legislation
can be attributed, in a large measure, to the Schechter decision,3 and the resultant
abandonment of the code standards of wages, hours, and the employment of
child labor, particularly by some government contractors, 4 such is but a partial
explanation. The origin of the Act can also be traced to a series of isolated and
-unrelated statutes fixing conditions in the award of Army,5 Navy 6 and Postal
contracts,7 as well as to the "8 hour law" s and the Bacon-Davis Act which re-
quired the payment of prevailing wages and limited work days in public works
contractsY Finally, the Act is an attempt to correct the anomalous position of
the federal government, encouraging the maintenance of high industrial stand-
ards on the one hand, but forced by virtue of statutory interpretation and man-
date to award contracts to the "lowest" responsible bidder 10 and thus assist those
most likely to maintain the poorest conditions of labor.
i. N. Y. Times, June 25, 3936, p. 20, col. 3; (936) 75 AUTO OTIvE INDUsTRIEs No. i.
Cf. Statement of Gerard D. Reilly, N. Y. Times, October 29, 1936, p. 46, col. 4.
2. 49 STAT. 2o36, 41 U. S. C. A. § 35-45 (Supp. 1936). Cf. English Trade Boards Act,
1909, 9 EDw. VII, c. 22.
3. A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (935).
4. Survey by Government Contract Division under NRA. See Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the Committee on the Judiciary on H. R. 11554, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (936)
13 et seq. See also id. at 194 for chart of the Children's Bureau, United States Dep't of
Labor, in re decreases in employment of child labor under the NRA codes.
5. 23 STAT. 109 (1884), io U. S. C. A. § I2OO (1927) ; see 31 STAT. 905 (901), IO U. S.
C. A. § 1201 (927) ; 34 STAT. 258 (1906), i0 U. S. C. A. § i2o5 (1927) (supplies and serv-
ices not in excess of $5oo can be procured on the open market) ; 18 STAT. 455 (0875), 41 U. S.
C. A. § io (1928) (Sec'y of War shall give preference to American materials).
6. 5 STAT. 617 (1843), 34 U. S. C. A. § 561 (1928) ; 32 STAT. 828 (1863), 34 U. S. C. A.
§ 572 (1928) ("no person shall be received as a contractor who is not a manufacturer of, or
regular dealer in, the articles which he offers to supply") ; 34 STAT. 1393 (3907), 34 U. S. C.
A. § 571 (3928) (supplies and services aggregating less than $5oo may be procured in open
market). See 21 Ops. ATrr'Y GEN. (1894) 56, and 5 Ops. ATr'y GEN. (1849) 89.
7. 27 STAT. 268 (1892), 39 U. S. C. A. §422 (3928) ; 39 STAT. i6I (I936), 39 U. S. C.
A. §429 (1928).
8. 37 STAT. 726 (913), amending 27 STAT. 340 (1892) [see Ellis v. United States, 206 U.
S. 246 (1907), 29 Ops. ATT'Y GEN. (1912) 488, 505], 40 U. S. C. A. §§321-323 (1928) (no
provision that such stipulation appear in the contract; penal enforcement). Cf. 15 STAT. 77
(1868), 4o U. S. C. A. §321 (1928), and see United States v. Martin, 94 U. S. 400 (3877) ;
see also Averill v. United States, 14 Ct. Cl. 200 0878) and 17 OPs. ATr'Y GEN. (1882) 341
for the limited application of this last Act.
9. 49 STAT. io1 (1935) ($2oo0 base), amending 46 STAT. 1494 (1931) ($5oo base), 40
U. S. C. A. § 276a (Supp. 1936) (Sec'y of Labor to determine prevailing wage; such was in-
serted in the contract which also contained other provisions similar to the Walsh-Healey
Act). See 48 STAT. 948 (934), 40 U. S. C. A. § 276b (Supp. 1936) (prohibiting "kick-
backs"). See also 48 STAT. 204 (933), 40 U. S. C. A. §§404 (c), 406 (Supp. 1936) (PWA
constructions). As to the general powers of executive heads to prescribe regulations for the
conduct of business, see i STAT. 28, 49, 65, 68, 553 (1798), 9 STAT. 395 (849), 37 STAT. 283
(1872), 5 U. S. C. A. §22 (927) ; 5 STAT. 112 (3836), 5 U. S. C. A. §26 (927), repealed
by 46 STAT. 1028 (1930), 5 U. S. C. A. §26 (Supp. 3936); compare 3o STAT. 316 (898), 5
U. S. C. A. § 29 (927) with 49 STAT. 1161, 5 U. S. C. A. §29a (Supp. 1936).
io. The basic statute, constantly referred to as REv. STAT. § 3709, is 32 STAT. 220 (i86I),
41 U. S. C. A. § 5 (1928). The statute does not expressly require that contracts be awarded
to the "lowest responsible bidder", but such is the fixed construction of the Act; see Schneider
v. United States, i9 Ct. Cl. 547 (1884) ; Scott v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 524 (3909) ; i9
(297)
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This requirement bad been suspended by Executive Order No. 6646, issued
March 14, 1934, which required that all government contractors certify compli-
ance with the codes, but, pursuant to the Supreme Court's decision in the
Schechter case, the Comptroller General ruled " that the earlier statutes were
binding. The net result was the forced departure by the higher type of employer
from desirable labor conditions, since he could not compete for government busi-
ness with the less scrupulous ones who had quickly reverted to sweatshop con-
ditions in order to be the "lowest" bidder. The speculative bid-broker, who
could post a bond to satisfy the requirement of "responsible bidder" competed
for all contracts, and subcontracted the work to the poorest type of employer;
moreover, the governmental agencies were, in the absence of special provisions,
powerless to prevent the award of contracts to those who may have violated
former ones. 2 In order to prevent all this, the Bacon-Davis Act and the "8 hour
law", 1 3 both of which were limited in application to public works, were seized
upon as precedents to formulate similar provisions in the Walsh-Healey Act
with regard to materials and supplies. Thus, at the added expense of the govern-
ment, through the "bait" of the award of contracts entailing large sums of
money,1 4 and through the completely voluntary nature of the compliance with
the terms of the Act,15 the government seeks to raise the standards of labor, and
yet avoid the attendant legal difficulties. Because of the great number of indus-
tries with which the government deals,' 6 and the practical difficulties involved in
the attempt to maintain different conditions of labor in a given plant supplying
both private and governmental orders,' 7 it is clear that the government hopes to
affect the entire industrial field.
Provisions
Approved by the President on June 30, 1936, after suffering several revi-
sions,' 8 the Act is effective as to invitations of government agencies and depart-
ments, issued after September 28, 1936, for bids in excess of $io,ooo. Briefly,
the Act requires that contracts entered into with any executive agency or instru-
mentality, contain stipulations and representations that the contractor is not a
"bid-broker"; that in the fulfillment of the contract no child or convict labor
Ops. ATT'y GEN. (1890) 685; 22 Ops. ATT'y GEN. (1897) I, 6; 33 Ops. ATT'y GEN. (1923)
453. See, generally, io DEcIs. CoMpT. GEN. (931) 294; Memorandum of the Judge Ad-
vocate General, 8o Cong. Rec., June 24, 1936, at 3798; Note (1912) 38 L. R. A. (N. s.) 653.
Note the express requirement that contracts for supplies be awarded to the "lowest respon-
sible bidder" in statutes cited supra notes 5, 6, 7.
I1. 14 DECIS. Comsn'. GEN. (935) go9; id. at 911. But see 49 STAT. 990 (1935), 41 U.
S. C. A. § 34 (1936). Cf. NRA, Div. of Rev. (1936) Work Materials No. 49.
12. See Scott v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 524 (199o). Cf. 39 STAT. 161 (ii6), 39 U. S.
C. A. § 429 (1928) (postal contractors who previously defaulted may be rejected) ; 12 STAT.
828 (863), 34 U. S. C. A. § 572 (1928) (Navy contractors or sureties who previously de-
faulted may be rejected).
13. Supra notes 8 and 9.
14. See table of value of materials for construction work on projects financed by federal
funds. The total value was listed at a billion and a quarter dollars. Hearings before a Sub-
committee of the Committee on" the Judiciary, supra note 4, at 157.
15. See A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 529 (935).
16. The Navy alone, in one year, purchases over 40,000 items involving 75,000 contracts
covering almost every phase of industry. The Army Ordnance Department enters into
over 11o contracts annually, each in excess of $1oooo. See Hearings before a Subcommittee
of the Committee on the Jvdiciary, supra note 4, at 169.
17. See statement of C. Parker Holt in Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Commit-
tee on the Judiciary, supra note 4, at 273-5.
18. The first proposed act was S. 3055, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935). This was known as
the Walsh Bill and was considerably modified by H. R. 11554, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (0936),
known as the Healey Bill.
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will be employed ;19 that the employees will be paid a minimum wage, as andt
when determined by the Secretary of Labor to be the local prevailing minimum
in the industry, for regular and overtime work (if such overtime work is per-
mitted by the Secretary) ; that the maximum work day and week shall be, respec-
tively, eight and forty hours; and that no part of the contract will be performed
under unsanitary or hazardous conditions. Further, there is a provision against
evasion of the wage requirement by prohibition of "kick-backs" 20 and rebates,
and for the enforcement of this and other representations contained in the con-
tract, provisions are made for liquidated damages, reservation of sums due the
contractor, cancellation of the contract, and a three year period during which no
government contracts shall be awarded to such violator. The Act is to be admin-
istered by the Secretary of Labor, who has the power to grant exemptions and
exceptions to any and all requirements of the Act when "justice or public interest
will be served thereby."
Scope
The Act is concerned only with contracts "in any amount exceeding
$ IO,OOO" 21 and does not apply to "purchases of such materials . . . as may
usually be bought in the open market; nor . . . to perishables, including dairy,
livestock, and nursery products, . . agriculture or farm products processed
for first sale by the original producers .... ," 22 The $iOooo base has already
presented a problem in the form of "split-bids" by which suppliers, unwilling to
subject themselves to the conditions of the Act, submit bids for only a part of a
contract in order that the total be less than $io,ooo. A recent instance of such
an attempt resulted in a ruling by the Secretary of Labor that such bids would
be rejected.2 3
The exception of "open market" purchases is the one most likely to cause
difficulty.24 The regulations under the Act define this to mean, "Where the con-
tracting officer is authorized by statute or otherwise to purchase in the open mar-
19. Cf. 46 STAT. 391 (1930), 18 U. S. C. A. § 744 (Supp. 1936), superseding 26 STAT. 839
(1891), I8 U. S. C. A. §744 (1927) ; 47 STAT. 711 (1932), amended by 48 STAT. 20, 99, 120,
121, 283 (1933), 15 U. S. C. A. §6o5b (Supp. 1936) ; 48 STAT. 204 (I933), 40 U. S. C. A.
§406 (Supp. 1936) ; 47 STAT. 418 (1932), 31 U. S. C. A. §686b (Supp. 1936). Note (1936)
49 HARv. L. REv. 466; Hiller, Development of the Systems of Control of Conzict Labor in the
U. S. (1914) 5 J. CRIm. L. 241.
2o. Note (1934) 34 CoL. L. REV. 733, in which the general problem of "kick-backs" and
rebates under state statutes prescribing payment of prevailing rates of wages in public works
contracts is discussed.
21. Section i. Cf. the proposed Walsh Act, supra note 18, which was to apply to all con-
tracts, regardless of amount involved; proposed Healey Act, § i, supra note 18, in which a
$2ooo base was applied. See Bacon-Davis Act, supra note 9. There is already an effort to
have the base sum in the present Act reduced; see N. Y. Times, July 31, 1936, p. io, col. i.
The base in the instant Act was increased in order to avoid the administrative problem of
enforcement of many small contracts.
22. Section 9. Cf. § 13 of the Healey Bill, supra note 18: "Nothing in this act shall be
construed to apply to agricultural or farm products processed for first sale by the original
producer. . . ." No mention is there made concerning purchases in the open market or pur-
chases of perishables.
23. An invitation was issued by the War Department for 12 trucks. Four firms submit-
ted bids: 3 manufacturers and i dealer. The dealer's bid was in excess of $io,ooo and he
agreed to the conditions of the Act. The other 3 bids were on only 7 and 8 units and, being
under $ioooo, did not contain submission to the Act. The Secretary of Labor rejected all
the bids and readvertised. (Oct. 31, 1936) BusiNEss WEEK 20. See N. Y. Times, Sept. 27,
1936, § 3, P. 9, col. 4.
Quwrre whether the various governmental agencies, reportedly perturbed over the delay
in supplies, will avoid the Act by themselves splitting invitations so as to get under the $ioOOO
exception?
24. See N. Y. Times, July 31, 1936, p. io, col. i: Hearinqs before a Subcommittee of the
Committee on the Judiciary, supra note 4, at 505.
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ket without advertising for proposals".25 The Attorney General has defined "open
market" to mean "market overt" not in the historical common law sense, but
rather to indicate a place "where the article is bought publicly, in the ordinary
mode of purchase between individuals, and . . . where goods of like descrip-
tion are ordinarily sold." 1 This would seem to include all products manufac-
tured for general use as distinguished from goods prepared in accordance with
government specification. 27 But the opinion goes on to limit the availability of
the open market purchase doctrine by distinguishing between contracts for imme-
diate delivery and those where the services or supplies are to be rendered or fur-
nished in the future and which therefore must be contracted for pursuant to
advertisement. Since under the ruling of the Department of Labor, the open
market exemption applies only to purchases where no advertising is required, the
result appears to be that an open market purchase must involve immediate sale
or delivery of goods s.2  And, of course, a further limitation exists under the
various statutes which permit open market purchases only where the aggregate
purchase is not in excess of $500.25
Finally there arises the problem of what persons are affected. The bid-
broker has been eliminated by the stipulation that "the contractor is the manu-
facturer or a regular dealer in the materials . . . ".10 Much of the argument in
the preparation of the bill, however, was concerned with the question of whether
the labor conditions represented in the contract should be applied only to em-
ployees of the contractor, or whether they should extend to the employees of any
subcontractor or other person furnishing any parts or materials which ultimately
reached the government in the finished product.31 As originally drafted, the Act
imposed its provisions upon both the principal contractor and any subcontractor
25. 1 FED. REG. 1626 (1936). The ruling of the Department of Labor, in an application
for exemption, under this provision, of a contract for petroleum, indicates that it is limited
only to such materials and supplies as may, by statute, be purchased without need for adver-
tising. (Nov. 4, 1936) NAT'L PETROL. NEws 10. See (1936) 117 ENGINEFAING NEws-
RECORD 458; (July 25, 1936) BusiNEss WEEK ii; (Sept. 5, 1936) id. at 32.
26. 6 Ops. ATr'v GEaN. (1853) 99, 100.
27. 29 Ops. Arr'Y GEN. (1912) 534, 543: "To determine what class of work is covered by
this definition must be largely a matter of administration, but, in my opinion, the general work
done by the contractor or sub-contractor in his plant, which is applicable and destined to the
fulfillment of his contracts with all persons generally, does not fall within the law. Only
that portion of the work which can be regarded as directed specifically to the fulfillment of
the government contract, and to nothing else, falls within the provisions of the act." This was
in response to an inquiry as to whether pig iron was included in the "8 hour law", 37 STAT.
137 (I912), 40 U. S. C. A. §324 (1928).
28. See 12 STAT. 220 (I86I), amended by 36 STAT. 861 (1910), 41 U. S. C. A. § 5 (1928)
(when immediate delivery or performance is requested, the article may be procured in open
market).
29. 34 STAT. 1193 (1907), 34 U. S. C. A. § 571 (1928) (may procure service and supplies
on open market when the aggregate does not exceed $500) ; 34 STAT. 258 (I9O6), io U. S. C.
A. § 1205 (1927) (same provision as above). 20ps. ATT'Y GEN. (1829) 257; 3 Ops. ATT'y
GEN. (1839) 437, 15 Ops. Ar'y GEN. (1877) 253.
30. Section I (a). See Regulations of the Secretary of Labor, i FED. REG. 1626 (1936):
"A manufacturer is a person who owns, operates, or maintains a factory or establishment that
produces on the premises the materials, supplies, articles, or equipment required under the
contract and of the general character described by the specifications.
"(b) A regular dealer is a person who owns, operates, or maintains a store, warehouse,
or other establishment in which the materials, supplies, articles, or equipment of the general
character described by the specifications and required under the contract are bought, kept in
stock, and sold to the public in the usual course of business."
See 20 STAT. 62 (878), 39 U. S. C. A. §445 (1928) (Postal Service) ; 12 STAT. 828
(1863), 34 U. S. C. A. § 572 (1928) ; Myers v. Pickett, 81 Tex. 53, 16 S. W. 643 (18g1).
Also 12 STAT. 596 (1862), 41 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1928) ; Francis v. United States, ii Ct. Cl.
638 (1875).
31. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, supra note
4. at 329, 390.
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or supplier of parts which were identified in the completed product.32 This was
modified so as to permit the principal contractor to discharge his obligation in re
compliance by the subcontractor by giving notice that the materials were to be
used on a government contract,33 but, even so, the contractor was subject to
additional burdens with regard to fulfilling the contract in the event the sub-
contractor violated the conditions.3 4 The present Act, however, makes no men-
tion of the enforcement of the conditions save as to "persons employed by the
contractor." 35 Hence, it would appear that one who furnishes materials to either
a manufacturer or a dealer to be used in fulfilling a government contract is not
bound by the Act. Such a limitation seriously restricts the possible area of appli-
cation, and, in the case of contracts with a dealer, it nullifies the entire effect of
the Act, furnishing a loophole for evasion which has been only partially checked
by the ruling of the Secretary of Labor with regard to undisclosed principals.
The regulation provides that "Whenever a dealer, to whom a contract . . . has
been awarded, causes a manufacturer to deliver directly to the government . . .
such dealer will be deemed the agent of the manufacturer in executing the con-
tract. As the principal of such agent, the manufacturer will be deemed to have
agreed to the stipulations contained in the contract." 31
An interesting problem of statutory interpretation is raised by Section I (e).
The section, which has not as yet been defined by the Department, reads that
"no part of such contract will be performed . . . under working conditions
which are unsanitary or hazardous. . . ." Inasmuch as the other subsections
of Section i refer to "persons employed by the contractor", it is probable that
this subsection will be construed to have a broader application, so as to apply to
contractors, subcontractors, and suppliers of any parts. Under this construction
the purposes of the Act are more likely to be effectuated, although problems of
administration will be thereby increased.
3 7
Administration
Compliance with the stipulations in the Act is to be effected through liqui-
dated damages for breaches, in addition to a fine of $io per day for each child or
convict laborer who is "knowingly" 'employed, and, "a sum equal to the amount
of any deductions, rebates, refunds, or underpayment of wages due to any
employee engaged in the performance of such contract." 8 Furthermore, the
contractor is liable for any additional expense incurred by the government in
procuring the completion of any unfulfilled contract. The Secretary of Labor is
authorized to enforce these provisions, administer the Act, and promulgate regu-
lations. Accordingly, the Secretary of Labor has appointed a board of three to
32. Walsh Bill, supra note 18, §§ i-A, 2, 2-A, 2-B, 3.
33. Healey Bill, supra note iS, §§ 2, 3.
34. Id. § 3 (4) : ". . the principal contractor shall, if directed by the contracting
officer upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Labor, cancel any sub-contract for a
breach by the sub-contractor of his representation or agreement, and failure on the part of the
principal contractor so to cancel shall subject his contract to cancellation."
35. Sections i (b), (c), (d). See 29 Ors. ATr'Y GEN. (II) 279.
The Regulations provide: "The stipulations shall be deemed applicable only to employees
engaged in or connected with the manufacture, fabrication, assembling, hauling, supervision,
or shipment of materials, supplies, articles, or equipment required under the contract and shall
not be deemed applicable to office or custodial employees." 1 FED. REG. 1627 (936). See
(Nov. 4, 1936) NAT'L PETROL. NEws I0.
36. Italics added. Circular Letter No. 192, Nov. 27, 1936. See Phila. Legal Intelli-
gencer, Dec. 7, 1936, p. I, col. 5.
37. Italics added. See (Oct. 22, 1936) IRox AGE 59. Perhaps the only purpose of the
provision is to eliminate homework, which has been a stumbling block in all attempts to regu-
late and supervise hour and wage conditions.
38. Section 2.
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handle the quasi-judicial functions under the Act. 9 Furthermore, the Secretary
is empowered to make investigations "and prosecute any inquiry necessary to his
functions in any part of the United States .... " 4 He is permitted to author-
ize the award of a contract to persons who otherwise would be barred for three
years by virtue of a breach of some prior government contract,41 to allow "rea-
sonable limitations" and "reasonable variations, tolerances, and exemptions to
and from any or all provisions of this Act. .... , 42 He is also required to
determine what are the "prevailing minimum wages" 4 and the rates for over-
time work, "which rate shall be not less than one and one-half times the basic
hourly rate received by any employee affected." 44
These broad powers of the Secretary of Labor were fearfully regarded by
those who were apprehensive of the pro-labor tendencies of the Department, as
virtually permitting an unrestricted subjugation of industry to the whims and
fancies of the Secretary. 45 However, it is to be noted that the specification of
the maximum hours of labor in the Act,46 and the limitation of the Secretary's
power to that of determining merely the fact of "prevailing wages" 47 is a con-
siderable reduction from the provisions of the original proposals.
4
Constitutionality
The basic problem with regard to constitutionality is the power of the Gov-
ernment to impose conditions, prescribed by the Act, in its contracts. Proponents
of the Act, to establish its validity, in addition to using the simple illustration of
the power of private persons to establish conditions in contracts, relied upon
previous state and federal statutes relating to hour and wage conditions in con-
tracts for the construction of public works.49  In addition, decisions invalidating
statutes which sought to regulate purely private contracts to which the state was
not a party, and which raised such issues as "due process", "equal protection of
39. N. Y. Times, July i8, 1936, p. I8, col. i; (I936) 8o Am. MACH. 645. On the hearings
which preceded the Act, Secretary Perkins suggested that because of the likelihood of numer-
ous requests for exemptions, and the burden of the Secretary's other functions, it would be
desirable to have an independent board to perform quasi-judicial functions. The Act, how-
ever, has not adopted the suggestion and the Secretary is fully responsible for both the min-
isterial and the quasi-judicial duties. See Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
on the Judiciary, supra note 4, at 125, 224.
40. Section 4. By authority of 46 STAT. 817 (1930), 5 U. S. C. A. § 943 (Supp. 1936),
repealing 44 STAT. 620o (1926), 5 U. S. C. A. §22 (1927) the Secretary of Labor may dele-
gate discretionary functions to incumbents of positions created by him. Section 5 of the
Walsh-Healey Act authorizes the Secretary or an impartial representative to conduct inves-
tigations upon complaint with regard to any of the usual provisions of the Act, including the
power to summon witnesses, produce evidence, and make findings of fact.
41. Section 3.
42. Section 6.
43. Section I (b).
44. Section 6 of the Act.
45. (June 27, 1936) BusINEss WEK 12.
46. Section I (c). See 29 Ops. Ai-r'y GEN. 371 (1912).
47. August 6, (1936) 103 PAPER TRADE JOURNAL 17: "The terms of the act do not
make it altogether clear whether the Secretary of Labor is empowered to fix wages for dif-
ferent classes of labor within an industry or whether the power is limited to the fixing of.
minimum wages for the industry as a whole. The Secretary has indicated in conference that
at this time the Department of Labor contemplates the establishment of basic minimum wages
only. and that it could not undertake, at least for the time being, to set up classified wage
scales on the basis of occupation or skill. . .. 11
48. Under § 8 of the proposed Walsh Bill, supra note 18, both minimum wages and max-
imum hours were to be fixed by the President, guided by a number of prescribed standards,
including the code provisions under NRA. See Hearings Before Committee on the Judiciary
on S. 3055, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935) 5. Section 8 of the Healey Bill, while abandoning
the reference to the codes, also set out a number of standards to aid the Secretary of Labor in
determining hour and wage provisions.
49. See statutes cited supra notes 8. 9.
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laws", and "freedom of contract", 50 referred in dicta to statutes prescribing con-
ditions in public works contracts as exceptions to the general rule.51 Although a
few cases failed to draw such a distinction, 52 the Supreme Court has established
the validity of conditions fixed by either state 53 or federal 14 government with
regard to public works contracts. Particularly noteworthy is the language of the
Court in Atkin v. Kansas,5 5 where, in upholding a conviction for violation of the
maximum hour requirement of a state statute prescribing an eight hour day and
payment of the current rate of wages on such contracts, the Court said,
. . .whatever may have been the motives controlling the enactment of the
statute in question, we can imagine no possible ground to dispute the power of
the State to declare that no one undertaking work for it . . should permit or
require an employee on such work to labor in excess of eight hours each
day. .. .," 56 When faced with a similar maximum hour provision in a federal
statute, the Court in Ellis v. United States 5 7 upheld a conviction for violation
thereof on the authority of Atkin v. Kansas, saying, "We see no reason to deny
to the United States the power thus established for the States." 58 The Court
further added "... Congress, as incident to its power to authorize and enforce
contracts for public works, may require that they shall be carried out only in a
way consistent with its views of public policy." 59 The statute involved in the
Ellis case was enacted because of an opinion by the Attorney General 1o that such
a stipulation could not be inserted by the President in a public works contract
without statutory authority because of the early statute requiring contracts for
services on behalf of the government to be awarded to the lowest responsible
bidder. The latter statute, however, has been interpreted as being solely for the
benefit of the government in order to assure good bargains through competitive
5o. Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 (o5) ; Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33 (1915) ;
Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 28 N. E. 1126 (i89I); Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113
Pa. 431, 6 Atl. 354 (1886) ; State v. Goodwill, 33 W. Va. 179, 1O S. E. 285 (889); Ramsey
v. People, 142 Ill. 380, 32 N. E. 364 (1892) ; Frankfurter, Hours of Labor and Realism in
Constitutional Law (1916) 29 H.Av. L. REv. 353; Harper, Due Process of Law in State
Labor Legislation (1928) 26 MicH. L. Rav. 599, 763, 888; 85 U. oF PA. L. RE¢. 113 (1936).
51. See Truax v. Raich, 239 U. S. 33, 40 (1915) ; Adkins v. Children's Hospital, 261
U. S. 525, 547 (1923) ; Myrick, Statutory Regulation of Wages (19o7) 65 CENT. L. J. 468.
52. Ex parte Kuback, 85 Cal. 274, 24 Pac. 737 (189o) ; People v. Coler, 166 N. Y. i,
59 N. E. 716 (19O) ; Seattle v. Smyth, 22 Wash. 327, 6o Pac. 1120 (19oo) ; cf. State v.
McNally, 48 La. Ann. 1450, 21 So. 27 (1896); see Myrick, Hours of Labor-Labor on
Public Works-Railroads (19o6) 63 CENT. L. J. 198.
53. Atkin v. Kansas, 19I U. S. 207 (1903); Heim v. McCall, 239 U. S. I75 (1915);
Elkan v. Maryland, 239 U. S. 634 (1915) ; Caldwell v. Louisiana, 17o La. 851, 129 So. 368
(193?), appeal dismissed, 282 U. S. 8O1 (1930) (employment of registered voters only;
dismissed for want of substantial federal question on authority of Atkh v. Kansas) ; Giana-
tisio v. Kaplan, 284 U. S. 595 (1931) (preference to disabled veterans in civil service).
54. Ellis v. United States, 206 U. S. 246 (1907) ; Greenwood County v. Duke Power Co.,
8i F. (2d) 986 (C. C. A. 4th, 1936), cert. granted, 56 Sup. Ct. 941; for arguments of coun-
sel, see (1936) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 154, 25o. For definition of "public works" see 28 Ops.
A'T'Y GEN. (1gio) 406; 34 id. (1927) 257.
55. 191 U. S. 207 (1903).
56. Id. at 222. Twenty-six states now have statutes prescribing payment of prevailing
rates in contracts for public works. Note (934) 34 COL. R. REV. 733.
57. Ellis v. United States, 2o6 U. S. 246 (1907).
58. Id. at 255; Mattison, Limitation of Hours of Labor and Fixing a Mininlm Wage
Scale on All Public Work by Statute, Ordinance or by Contract (92) 5 MARQ. L.
REv. I50.
59. Ellis v. United States, 206 U. S. 246, 256 (i97). Cf. United States v. Tingey, 5 Pet.
115, 128 (U. S. 1831) : Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S. 1, 21 (1888).
6o. 19 Ops. Ar'Y GEN. (i8go) 686: "a public officer who should let a contract for a
larger sum than would be otherwise necessary by reason of a condition that a contractor's
employees should only work eight hours a day would directly violate the law." See Mevw-
randum of the Jidqe Advocate General, 8o Cong. Rec., March 12, 1936, at 3798, which pre-
ceded the enactment of the instant Act.
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bidding.6 1 And, since under the decisions, certain of the provisions of that stat-
ute can be waived by the Government,62 it would appear that its only function
is to enunciate a governmental policy.63 In the light of the language of the Ellis
case and the spasmodic variations from the "lowest-bidder" Act authorized by
various unrelated statutes, 64 it would certainly appear that Congress could totally
renounce that policy and enunciate a new one, as is contained in the provisions
of the Walsh-Healey Act. Nor can there be any reasonable line of differentia-
tion between labor on public works and labor on materials and supplies for other
governmental functions so as to warrant permitting the imposition of conditions
in contracts for the former but denying it in the latter.
Conceding, therefore, that Congress has the power to impose conditions in
all governmental contracts, the problem arises as to the nature of the conditions
imposed by the instant Act. With the mandatory eight hour daily and forty
hour weekly maximums prescribed there can be no difficulty under the decided
cases, " except, perhaps, the problem of whether a given employee, having
worked eight hours a day on a government contract, may thereafter work on
a private contract.66 But not so easily disposed of is the provision for payment
of prevailing wages. That question was not in issue in either the Ellis or Atkin
cases.6 7  In Connolley v. General Construction Co.,6" an Oklahoma statute pro-
vided for the payment of "current rate of per diem wages" in the "locality", on
public works contracts. The Supreme Court, in granting an injunction re-
straining threatened criminal prosecution provided for by the statute, held that
the statute was so vague as to violate the due process clause.69  The instant Act,
61. 22 Ois. ATT'y GEN. (1897) 6. See NRA, Div. of Rev., (936) Work Materials
No. 27.
62. United States v. New York and Porto Rico S. S. Co., 239 U. S. 88 (1915) (con-
tract not reduced to writing as required by statute can be enforced by the United States
against a recalcitrant bidder); American Smelting Co. v. United States, 259 U. S. 75
(1922) (though not entered into pursuant to required advertisement, the government may
enforce a contract) ; cf. Scott v. United States, 44 Ct. Cl. 524 (909); O'Brien v. Carney,
6 F. Supp. 761 (D. C. Mass. J934) (lowest bidder has no standing contractually, or as a
taxpayer, to compel acceptance of his bid) ; Colorado Pay. Co. v. Murphy, 78 Fed. 28 (C.
C. A. 8th, 1897) ; Kelly v. Chicago, 62 Ill. 279 (1871) ; State v. McGrath, 91 Mo. 386, 3
S. W. 846 (1886).
63. See United States v. Martin, 94 U. S. 400 (1876), in which the Court, discussing
the original eight-hour law, I5 STAT. 77 (I868), and denying recovery to an employee of the
government for work in excess of eight hours a day, said at p. 404: "We regard the statute
chiefly as in the nature of a direction from a principal to his agent . . . in which a third
party has no interest"; cf. United States v. Driscoll, 96 U. S. 421 (1877) ; I; re Dalton, 61
Kan. 257, 59 Pac. 336 (1899) ; Byars v. State, 2 Okla. Crim. 481, 102 Pac. 8o4 (i9o9).
64. This is best exemplified by the Davis-Bacon Act, supra note 9.
65. Note, however, the express exemption of contracts for government supplies in the
eight-hour law. 37 STAT. 138 (1912), 40 U. S. C. A. §325 (1928).
66. People ex rel. Hausauer-Jones Printing Co. v. Zimmerman, 58 Misc. 264, 1O9 N. Y.
Supp. 396 (Sup. Ct. 19o9). Any other construction would probably invoke censure as an
attempted regulation of private business, with the raising of the usual bugaboos of due
process, interference with freedom of contract, and the other phrases under which such legis-
lation has been condemned. However, the Regulation of the Secretary of Labor provides:
"If in any one week or part thereof an employee is engaged in work covered by the contrac-
tor's stipulations, his overtime shall be computed after eight hours in any one day or after
4o hours in any one week during which no single daily total of employment may be in excess
of eight hours without payment of the overtime rate." i FEI. REG. 1627 (1936).
67. Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U. S. 2o7 (i9o3) ; Ellis v. United States, 2o6 U. S. 246 (19O7).
68. 269 U. S. 385 (1926).
69. See United States v. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U. S. 81 (i92i) ; cf. Nash v. United
States, 229 U. S. 373, 377 (1913) ; Campbell v. City of New York, 244 N. Y. 317, I55 N. E.
628 (1927) (in which the statute defined "prevailing rate" as the "rate paid to a majority of
the laborers, workmen, or mechanics engaged in the same trade or occupation in the city of
New York") ; Ruark v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 157 Md. 576, 146 Atl.
797 (1929).
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providing for the payment of the "prevailing minimum wages . . . in the local-
ity", is no more definite.70 However, the Walsh-Healey Act should not call for
the strict construction applied in the Connolley case in that violations of the Act
are not criminal.71 Furthermore, the wage rate is not to be applied except to"contracts relating to such industries as have been the subject matter of a de-
termination by the Secretary of Labor; 72 no such provision was present in the
act invalidated in the Connolley case.
The powers of the Secretary of Labor, however, raise the suggestion of attack
on grounds of delegation of legislative power. Assuming that the determination
of "prevailing minimum rates of wages" and "locality" will, as is probable, be
regarded as administrative findings of fact,7 3 the further provision in the Act
that variations and exemptions allowed by the Secretary to any and all provi-
sions of the Act shall be "reasonable" 74 should raise no serious legal obstacle.
Such determination should be regarded as involving the discretion of the Sec-
retary, and as such, will not be reviewable except for abuse.7 5 It would appear,
therefore, that the functions of the Secretary of Labor, including the "authority
from time to time to make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act",7 6 will be sustained as
70. Section I (b).
71. See supra note 38. However, it may be possible to bring criminal action for con-
spiracy to violate the provisions of the Act under 21 STAT. 4 (1879), 35 STAT. 1o96 (i9og),
18 U. S. C. A. § 88 (1927) ; United States v. Gradwell, 243 U. S. 476 (917) ; United States
v. Stone, 135 Fed. 392 (D. N. J. 1905) ; United States v. Plyler, 225 U. S. 15 (I9II) ; cf.
United States v. Golder, ii F. Supp. 870 (E. D. Pa. 1935), which involved an indictment
for conspiracy to violate the "kickback" provision of 49 Stat. 1013 (1935), 40 U. S. C. A.
§276 (b) (1936) ; United States v. Terranova, 7 F. Supp. 989 (N. D. Cal. 1934).
72. Section ii. Cf. United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U. S. 77
(1932) ; Pacific Tel. & Teleg. Co. v. Seattle, 291 U. S. 300 (I934). Note that in the Con-
nolley case the Court did not quarrel with the power of the state to prescribe minimum
wages as conditions in public contracts. The sole controversy was the sufficiency of the
standard of conduct for purposes of a criminal prosecution. See (July 23, 1936) 138 IRON
Aa 52. Under the Bacon-Davis Act, also, the prevailing wage must be predetermined and
specified in the contract.
An interesting practical problem arises with regard to possible conflict of the deter-
mined "prevailing minimum wage" and union wages. Qucere whether the union wage base
will be used as the measure of "prevailing"?
73. United States to the use of Wylie v. Barstow & Co., 79 F. (2d) 496 (C. C. A. 2d,
1935); Ruark v. International Union of Operating Engineers, 157 Md. 576, 146 Ati. 797
(1929) ; (1936) 117 ENGlNruNG Nmvs-REcoRD 348; cf. Muser v. Magone, 155 U. S. 240
(I894) ; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 3.56 (1886).
74. The Act contains an ambiguous clause which reads, "Upon a written finding by the
head of the contracting agency or department that the inclusion in the . . . contract . * I
of the stipulations set forth . . . will seriously impair the conduct of Government business,
the Secretary of Labor shall make exceptions in specific cases or otherwise when justice or
public interest will be served thereby." Section 6 (italics added). Note that the same sec-
tion provides that modification of existing contracts "nay" be granted by the Secretary upon
joint recommendation of the contracting agency and the contractor, and the same language,
i. e., "may" is used with regard to "variations" and "exemptions". Section 8 of the Healey
Bill, supra note 18, used the word "may" consistently throughout the section. The change to
the mandatory "shall" was probably to placate army and naval procurement officers who
feared the delay of programs because of the Act. See Journal of Commerce, Dec. 12, 1936,
p. I, col. 5.
75. Determination of existence of "emergency" is not reviewable. United States v. Speed,
8 Wall. 77 (1868). See the standards held valid in Field v. Clark, 143 U. S. 649 (1892),
United States v. Grimaud, 220 U. S. 5o6 (1907), Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373 (913),
Brent v. United States, 266 U. S. 127 (1928), Fed. Radio Comm. v. Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.
S. 266; cf. Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U. S. 288 (1935) ; A. L. A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495 (1935).
76. Section 9. See Morrill v. Jones, 1o6 U. S. 466 (1882) (regulations must conform to
the law) ; Ex parte Reed, 1OO U. S. 13 (1879) (regulations have the force and effect of law).
Courts will take judicial notice of such regulations: Wilkins v. United States, 96 Fed. 837,
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valid, under the well established doctrine that Congress may prescribe general
legislative policies and purposes, establish standards, and impose upon an ex-
ecutive officer the administrative function of determining facts and establishing
rules and regulations to effectuate such policies and purposes.
7 7
Effects
The limited experience under the Act, indicates that in some measure the
fear that government supplies would be delayed because of the interposition of a
third agency between the governmental department and the contractor, and that
fewer bids would be tendered, is not without some justification. Several 're-
quests have already been made for exemptions,7 8 and a naval invitation for bids
to supply copper is going begging for want of bidders who are willing to subject
themselves to the terms of the Act and to the possible investigations and adverse
publicity attendant upon violation thereof.
7 9
A basic obstacle to the achievement of the desired ends by means of the
Act is the nature of the wage requirement. Thus, through the provision that the
minimum established be that which prevails in the locality, the low standard
areas such as the southern states, may be at an advantage in the competition for
government supplies. Instead of assisting in raising standards, the Act may
react against the interests of labor by sanctioning the continuance of the status
quo, and perhaps generally depressing wage standards. This will be the result
in the absence of a direct violation of the language of the Act by viewing the
entire United States as the "locality" or by redefining "prevailing" in terms of
reasonable value of the services rendered.80
H.A.T.
The Robinson-Patman Act
By its recent decisions upholding the Illinois and California Fair Trade
Acts,1 the Supreme Court has sustained the most common of the several types
841 (C. C. A. 3d, I899), cert. denied, 175 U. S. 727 (1899) ; Consolidated Gas Co. v. Hardy,
14 F. Supp. 223 (S. D. N. Y. 1936) ; cf. Nagle v. United States, 145 Fed. 302 (C. C. A. 2d,
i9o6) ; see (1936) 117 ENGINEERIN NGEws-REcOan 458 (criticizing the Regulations issued by
the Secretary of Labor as virtually a re-writing of the Act).
77. Compare Hearin.qs before a Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, supra
note 4. at 451, with Reilly, Memorandum of Constitutional Law with Respect to H. R. 11554,
id. at 537. And see NRA, Div. of Rev. (1936) Work Materials No. 26.
78. Cotton Textile Manufacturers were one of the first to seek an exemption. It was
denied: (1936) 75 AUooTIVE INDUSTRIES 536. The petroleum industry was also denied an
exemption: (Nov. 4, 1936) NAT'L PETROL. NEwS IO.
79. Journal of Commerce, Dec. 12, 1936, p. I, col. 5. The Secretary admitted that re-
cently governmental departments experienced difficulty getting supplies. Such delays, in the
earlier applications of the Act, are not especially foreboding, since many firms which in fact are
maintaining the standards prescribed as conditions, are hesitant because of the novelty. (1936)
75 AUTOMOTIVE INDUSTRIES 2. (The average work week in the automotive industry is 32/
hours). But see N. Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1936, § 4, p. 8, col. 3. Note, however, the amendment
of regulations issued Oct. 17, 1936, "(Records of Employment.)-Every contractor . . .
shall maintain the following records of employment which shall be available for the inspec-
tion and transcription of authorized representatives of the Secretary of Labor. . . ." The
regulations specify that the records should include the name, address, sex, occupation, date
of birth, wage and hour record of each employee working on a government contract. i FED.
REG. 1891 (1936).
8o. See section 9 of the Healey Bill in Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee
ont the Judiciary, supra note 4. at 123.
I. Old Dearborn Distributing Co. v. Seagram-Distillers Corp., U. S. Sup. Ct., (1936), 4
U. S. L. WEEK 356; Pep Boys v. Pyroil Sales Co., U. S. Sup. Ct., (936), 4 U. S. L. WEEx
359-
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of legislation enacted within the past few years to stabilize the field of compe-
tition. Such statutes, legalizing contracts between manufacturers, distributors
and retailers fixing the resale prices of trade-marked articles and making the
prices so fixed binding upon all persons selling the same article with knowledge
of the price-fixing contract, and thus substantially resembling the Capper-Kelly
bills introduced in several Congresses,2 have been passed by a total of thirteen
states;' the New York statute, however, has been held unconstitutional by the
Court of Appeals of that state as a legislative regulation of business not affected
with a public interest.4
A second type of statute with the same general objective forbids sales below
cost for the purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition; 5 such
an act has been upheld in California. 6 Akin to it are statutes permitting the
establishment, after investigation to determine the amount necessary in the light
of certain stated factors, of minimum prices in personal service trades; statutes
of Florida and Iowa under which prices to be charged by barbers were fixed
have been held unconstitutional by the state supreme courts.
7
A few state legislatures and the Canadian Parliament have enacted roughly
similar statutes prohibiting price discrimination for the purpose of destroying
competition or injuring a competitor, and making unlawful the granting of secret
rebates, refunds, commissions or unearned discounts tending toward that result.8
To the same ends is directed the recently enacted Robinson-Patman Act.9
2. S. 97, 72d Cong., ist Sess. (1931); H. R. II, 72d Cong., ist Sess. (ig3i).
3. CAL. GEN. LAws (Deering, i931) Act 8782, tit. 614, amended, CAL. GEN. LAws
(Deering, Supp. 1933) Act 8782, tit. 614; ILL. REV. STAT. (Cahill & Moore, 1935) c. 40,
§§ 8-11; Iowa Laws 1935, c. io6; La. Acts 1936, no. I3; Md. Laws 1935, c. 212, §§ 105-1o9;
N. J. Laws 1935, c. 58; N. Y. Laws 1935, c. 976; OHIo CODE (Throckmorton, Supp. 1936)
§ 64o2 et seq.; Ore. Laws 1935, c. 295; PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 73, §§ 7-1i; Va.
Acts 1936, c. 321; Wash. Laws 1935, c. 177 (effective for two years only) ; Wis. Laws 1935,
c. 52, §2.
4. Doubleday, Doran & Co. v. P. H. Macy & Co., 269 N. Y. 272, 199 N. E. 409 (1936).
The California and Illinois courts, on the other hand, upheld the acts on the ground that the
police power extends to the protection of a producer's goodwill. Max Factor & Co. v. Kuns-
man, 55 P. (2d) 177 (Cal. 1936) ; Joseph Triner Corp. v. McNeil, 363 Ill. 559, 2 N. E. (2d)
929 (936). Without going into a discussion of the extent of the police power, which occu-
pied the major part of the two state decisions, the Supreme Court pointed out that contracts
such as those which the acts legalized had been upheld on common law principles until the
decision in Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (IgII) in which they
were held to violate the Sherman Anti-Trust Act insofar as they restrained interstate com-
merce. As to the fact that the acts make the price fixed binding on all other sellers knowing
of the price-fixing agreement, even though they are not parties to it, the Court said that as
the purpose was to prevent the destruction of the value of the producer's trade-mark by price-
cutting it was an appropriate means for the protection of a legitimate property right.
5. Cal. Stats. 1935, p. 1546, § 3; Conn. Gen. Stats. 1935, c. 135a, § 962c (sales of drugs at
less than manufacturer's wholesale list price per dozen prohibited) ; Ky. Laws 1936, c. io9,
§ 3; La. Laws 1936, no. 152 (sales of drugs for less than cost prohibited).
Following the decision in the Doubleday, Doran case there was introduced in the legis-
lature of New York the so-called Livingston Bill, providing, inter alia, for the creation of a
Distributing Trade Commission to enforce the prohibition of sales below cost of any com-
modity bearing the trade-mark or brand of the producer. The legislature adjourned without
acting upon it. (March 14, 1936) x29 PuB. WCLY. it59.
6. People v. Cahn, Cal. Sup. Ct., (1936), 4 U. S. L. WEEK 49.
7. State ex rel. Fulton v. Ives, 167 So. 394 (Fla. 1936) ; Duncan v. Des Moines, 268 N.
W. 547 (Iowa, 1936).
8. Cal. Stats. 1935, P. 1546, § , 7; Ky. Laws 1936, c. 109, § I, 7; Wis. Laws 1935, C.
52, § 1; 25 &:26 GEo. V, c. 56, § 9 (Can. 1935).
9. Pub. L. No. 692, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (March i9, 1936), i5 U. S. C. A. § 13 (Supp.
1936). Congressman Patman is reported to have stated that Junior Robinson-Patman Acts
would be introduced in 43 state legislatures meeting in 1937. (Oct. I5, 1936) 177 PRINTERS'
INK 17.
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Provisions
The Act has two principal sections, introduced into Congress, respectively,
as the Robinson-Patman bill 10 and the Borah-Van Nuys bill 11 (the latter almost
identically resembling the Canadian statute), both of which were originally
framed as amendments to Section 2 of the Clayton Anti-Trust Act 12 which out-
lawed discriminations in price between different purchasers of commodities
where the effect of such discrimination might be "to substantially lessen compe-
tition or to tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce." It did, how-
ever, expressly permit discrimination "on account of differences in the grade,
quality or quantity of the commodity sold, or that makes only due allowance for
differences in the cost of selling or transportation, or . . . made in good faith
to meet competition."
Early decisions of federal courts under this section limited its application to
cases where the discrimination lessened competition in the line of commerce in
which the discriminator was engaged, i. e., among sellers. 13 The Supreme Court,
however, gave greater effect to the Act by holding, in the case of George Van
Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co.,14 that the phrase "any line of commerce"
forbade discriminations lessening competition between buyers as well. But, while
this in a measure revitalized the section, its applicability was still limited by the
fact that both the purchase favored and the purchase discriminated against had
to be in interstate commerce, and two major loopholes remained-the prdvisos
permitting a quantity discount and discriminations made in good faith to meet
competition. For, while the Act limited permissible differentials for differences
in the cost of selling or transportation to those making "only due allowance"
therefor, no such limitation was placed on those made on account of differences
in quantity. In the recent Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. case 15 the Federal
Trade Commission ordered the tire company to cease allowing Sears, Roebuck
& Co. differentials greater than were justified by the economies resulting from
the large quantity of the purchase but, as already indicated in this REVIEw, 16
such a construction of the section seems doubtful. And the proviso allowing
discriminations made in good faith to meet competition likewise excused the
granting of disproportionate discounts to certain buyers; since the latter were,
by reason of their strength, able to exact the same concessions from all sellers,
the grantor of a discount could easily justify his conduct on the ground that he
was doing no more than his competitors were.
Whereas, as previously indicated, Section 2 of the Clayton Act originally
applied only to discriminations in which both transactions were in interstate
commerce, 17 the Robinson-Patman amendment, by use of the words "where
either or any of the purchases involved in such discriminations are in interstate
commerce", is intended to apply to discriminations between all customers of a
seller who engages in interstate commerce, regardless of whether the particular
discrimination complained of arose out of an interstate or intrastate transaction,
10. S. 3154, H. R. 8442, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
. S. 4171, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936).
12. 38 STAT. 740 (914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 13 (1927).
13. Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denied,
262 U. S. 759 (1923) ; National Biscuit Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 299 Fed. 733 (C. C. A.
2d, 1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 613 (924).
14. 278 U. S. 245 (1929).
15. In the Matter of Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., Federal Trade Commission, March 5,
1936, 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1030.
16. (936) 84 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1030, 1032.
17. The Clayton Act uses simply the term "commerce" which is later defined in the Act
to mean interstate and foreign (as distinguished from intrastate) commerce. 38 STAT. 730
(1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 12 (927).
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so long as the tendency of such discrimination will be toward lessening of com-
petition or the creation of a monopoly.
The Clayton Act did not prevent discrimination in price based on differences
in the quantity of the commodity sold; the amending Act, on the other hand,
limits the permissible differentials to the actual saving resulting from the differ-
ent methods or quantities involved in the purchase. Allowance of a discount for
economies resulting from different methods of sale raises the problem of the
extent to which administrative and promotional expenses can be attributed to a
particular buyer or class of buyers and not to others. To use an illustration
frequently recurring in discussions of the bill,'8 if a seller relies on a single
method of getting business, e. g., a large and expensive sales force, the mere fact
that he receives an order for a particularly large quantity of goods will not
ordinarily enable him to reduce the number of his salesmen. The incidental
large-quantity buyer, therefore, cannot claim a discount on the ground that the
cost per unit of obtaining his order was relatively small, but can claim only the
economies resulting in the course of packing, shipping, billing, etc. If, on the
other hand, the quantity buyer is a steady customer, and the knowledge of an
assured outlet at a low sales cost leads the seller to retain a sales force only for
the purpose of obtaining the orders of other customers, a discount representing
the lower cost per unit of selling to the quantity buyer would seem entirely
justified.
As originally introduced, the Patman bill permitted functional differentials,
i. e., differentials based on whether the purchaser is a wholesaler or a retailer, 19
but this proviso was subsequently dropped. While it was held, in the Mennen
and the National Biscuit Co. cases,2 0 that such differentials were not prohibited
by Section 2 of the Clayton Act, yet, the authority of these decisions, based as
they were on the idea that the section forbade only such discriminations as
lessened competition with the seller, is impaired by the later Van Camp decision.
Since functional differentials are, however, not forbidden by the Robinson-
Patman Act, they would seem permissible, even though not justified by resulting
economies, so long as they are not so great as to give the retailers buying from
the favored wholesaler a substantial competitive advantage over retailers pur-
chasing directly from the manufacturer at the higher retailer's rate.2
1
The right to give discounts for quantity, even when wholly justified by
resulting savings, may be limited by the Federal Trade Commission if, after a
prescribed investigation, it finds that "available purchasers in greater quantities
are so few as to render differentials on account thereof unjustly discriminatory
or promotive of monopoly." But until this limit on quantity (and not on the
price differential) is fixed by the Commission, justifiable quantity differentials
are unrestricted.
Subsection (a) concludes with provisos permitting the bona fide selection
of customers, similar to that in the Clayton Act, and permits price changes in
response to changes in the market for or marketability of the goods involved.
18. H. . REP., No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) IO; Hearings before House .udic-
iary Committee on H. R. 8442, 74th Cong., ist Sess. (1936) 34.
ig. Hearings before House Judiciary Committee on H. R. 8442, 74th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1936) 34.
20. Mennen Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 288 Fed. 774 (C. C. A. 2d, 1923), cert. denied,
262 U. S. 759 (1923) ; National Biscuit Co. v. Federal Trade Comm., 299 Fed. 733 (C. C.
A. 2d, 1924), cert. denied, 266 U. S. 613 (1924).
21. Thus the Federal Trade Commission has issued a complaint against a tile manufac-
turer for violating § 2 (a) in allowing a 15% discount on all glazed tile regardless of quantity
sold to so-called wholesalers, which discount is denied to tile contractors, since wholesalers
sell directly to the ultimate consumer and are thus directly in competition with the contractors.
(1936) 4 U. S. L. WEEK 97.
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Subsection (b), which applies only to hearings before the Federal Trade
Commission, provides that proof of discrimination makes out a prima facie case
of violation of the Act, the burden of rebutting which is on the person charged.
22
But nothing "herein contained" is to prevent him from showing that the lower
price was made to meet an equally low price of a competitor. This is, however,
stated not to be a defense; such evidence is simply made admissible, the proviso
being "intended to operate only as a rule of evidence". 2  As Representative
Utterback pointed out, if meeting competition were to be a defense the bill would
be completely nullified, for all sellers competing for the chain trade would then
be free to continue their discriminations so long as they did not underbid one
another; whether or not the discrimination is a violation of the Act is to be deter-
mined by reference to the other sections.2 4 But in no other part of the section is
the existence of the offense dependent upon the presence or absence of competi-
tion with the seller. And a discrimination is unlawful not because its purpose
is to prevent competition or create a monopoly but because that is the result, so
that the fact that a seller was animated by a desire to meet competition rather
than to destroy somebody in some area of competition is immaterial. Thus it
seems that all the proviso does is to permit the person charged to put before the
Commission evidence which may lead it to judge him less severely.
The phrase "to meet the equally low price of a competitor" has been the
basis of conjectures that the Act will transfer price initiative to the local seller.
Even if the competition defense did amount to anything, it is allowed only in
hearings before the Federal Trade Commission, and not in the more to be feared
suits by individuals alleging injury. In the main, therefore, the relation of the
prices charged by one seller to those charged by his competitors is immaterial;
the sole test is whether or not an injurious discrimination is justified by savings
resulting from the method or the quantity of the purchase.
Succeeding subsections of this section of the new Act are addressed to the
problems of fake brokerage, allowances, discounts, etc., by means of which an
unjustified discrimination might indirectly be effected.2 5  As these subsections
are coordinate with and structurally distinct from subsection (a), the field of
commerce to which they are made applicable must be determined from their own
language.
Subsection (c), which applies simply to persons engaged in interstate com-
merce, is designed to meet the problem of fake brokerage allowances. In the
committee reports to both houses it is flatly stated that the subsection prohibits
the payment of brokerage commissions to intermediaries subject to the direct or
indirect control of the other party,26 yet qualifying the prohibition is the clouding
clause "except for services rendered in connection with the sale or purchase".
If it could be shown, therefore, that a brokerage agency owned by a buyer
actually rendered a service to the seller, an allowance of a commission could be
upheld.
22. In an action at law for violation of § 2 of the Clayton Act, after a discrimination has
been shown, the burden of justifying it is on the defendant. American Can Co. v. Ladoga
Canning Co., 44 F. (2d) 763, 768 (C. C. A. 7th, 193o), cert. denied, 282 U. S. 899 (1931).
23. H. R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 7.
24. 8o Cong. Rec., June 15, 1936, at 956o.
25. Hearings of the House Committee on Investigation of the American Retail Federa-
tion held in 1935 brought out the fact that in 1934 the A. & P. chain received advertising and
quantity discounts of $6,I05,OOO, and $2,o0o,00o in brokerage. Quoted in Hearings before
House Judiciary Committee on H. R. 8442, 74th Cong. xst Sess. (1936) 268. But this rep-
resented only 0.759% of A. & P.'s total sales for the year. McPhee, Let's Look at Allow-
ances (Oct. 15, 1936) 177 PRINTERS' INK 65.
26. SEN. REP. No. 2502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 7; H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) I5.
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Subsection (d), which, like subsection (c), applies to interstate commerce
only, is directed at allowances for advertising and similar services to large pur-
chasers as a result of which they get an unfair competitive advantage because
either the allotment allows them to obtain considerable free advertising for them-
selves in connection with the advertisement of the product, 27 an advantage denied
their smaller competitors, or the allowance is simply a rebate in disguise. Accord-
ingly, the payment of compensation for any services or facilities furnished in
connection with the advertising or promotion of the seller's goods is unlawful,
unless "available on proportionally equal terms to all other customers competing"
in the distribution of the product. As introduced in the House, and as passed by
the Senate, the word "offered" was used in place of "available", which latter
would seem, therefore, not to require an actual offer to all customers provided
they could get an allowance if they sought it.2"
"Proportionally equal terms" likewise involves difficulty. While the debates
on the floor of Congress seemed to indicate a belief that the amount of adver-
tising allowance which a customer could claim was to be determined by the num-
ber of his stores and the sizes of the windows,29 with no regard for other factors
affecting the value of the seller's display space, such a construction should be
avoided since it ignores many other equally important factors, such as the promi-
nence of the location, amount of business transacted, etc. The committee reports
recognize this in setting no arbitrary standard, but in stating that the person
seeking the proportional allowance must be able to furnish the service "under
conditions of the same value to the seller." 30 As this is purely a matter of fact
in each case, the seller's business judgment will be his only guide, but except in
the case of hearings before the Federal Trade Commission, the burden of proving
that a customer denied an advertising allowance could have furnished the seller
with services equally as valuable as those furnished by a favored customer will
be on the buyer.
Another problem arises as to the meaning of "competing". When an adver-
tising allowance is given to a widespread chain, what other buyers may claim a
similar allowance? Since the purchase of the chain's facilities reduces its over-
head and makes it possible for it to cut its prices, an allowance would have to be
made available to all other customers in the competitive area in which such a
price cut would operate, the determination of which is again a difficult question
of fact. Finally, whom does the Act mean by "customers"? Whereas most
chains are direct customers of the manufacturer, the independent retailer, whose
protection is the main purpose of the Act,31 obtains the manufacturer's product
not directly but through a jobber. He is competing with the chain, but is he a
customer of the seller? The fact that subsection (a) covers the situation of the
purchaser from the jobber by using the phrase "or customers of either of them",
and that is omitted here, might be taken to indicate that the retailer purchasing
27. The Senate bill as reported permitted advertising allowances where "(2) the busi-
ness, identity, or interests of such customer are in no way publicly associated, by name, refer-
ence, allusion, proximity or otherwise, with or in the furnishing of such services or facilities,
and the consideration paid therefor does not exceed the fair value of such services or facilities
in the locality where furnished." SEN. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 2.
28. The House Committee Report does not clarify this matter, but treats both this and
the next subsection as if they mean the same thing in this respect, saying simply that the
advantages must be "accorded or made available". H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1936) 16.
29. 8o Cong. Rec., May 28, 1936, at 8447-8.
30. SEN. REP. No. 1502, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 8; H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1936) 16.
31. The Patman bill's title stated it to be "a bill . . . to protect the independent
merchant, the public whom he serves, and the manufacturer from whom he buys, from ex-
ploitation from unfair competitors." H. R. 8442, 74th Cong., Ist Sess. (1935).
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from the jobber is unable to claim an allowance in this case. The jobber, how-
ever, as a practical matter, is competing with the chain just as much as is the
independent, and, as he is a customer of the seller, to the extent that he is able
to furnish services of proportionately the same value, e. g., through cooperating
with his customers in newspaper advertising and neighborhood window displays,
he seems entitled to an allowance, which can in turn be passed on to the retailer.
Subsection (e) prohibits furnishing services to purchasers upon terms not
accorded to all purchasers proportionally equally. The reports to the House of
both the Judiciary 32 and the Conference Committees 33 refer to subsections
(d) and (e) together, as if they differed only in the subject matter of the allow-
ance. The failure to specify that the seller be engaged in interstate commerce
may be immaterial, it being presumed that Congress did not intend to legislate
in regard to matters over which it has no jurisdiction; likewise the use of "pur-
chasers" instead of "customers". There is, however, no requirement that the
purchasers be competing. Further, services must not simply be "available" but
must be "accorded" to all purchasers on proportionally equal terms.
Thus far the Act is addressed wholly to the seller; it becomes applicable
to the buyer as well under subsection (f) which makes it unlawful for anyone
in the course of interstate commerce knowingly to receive or induce a prohibited
price discrimination. The section prescribes no penalties, but, as it becomes a
part of the Clayton Act, the sanctions of that Act become available against the
violator. 34
Section 2 of the Robinson-Patman Act, in addition to providing that the
Act shall not affect proceedings pending or completed under Section 2 of the
Clayton Act, provides that if the Federal Trade Commission has reason to
believe that a person against whom it issued a cease-and-desist order for viola-
tion of the original Section 2 is continuing the same activities in such a way as
to constitute a violation of the Act as amended, it may reopen the original pro-
ceedings and issue a supplementary complaint, and, thereafter, follow the same
procedure as in the case of an original complaint. 5 The purpose of this pro-
vision, which was introduced at the suggestion of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, is to preserve the record of the Goodyear case and make unnecessary the
reproof of matters in the original proceeding that would be relevant in a pro-
ceeding for violation of the present Act.3 6
Section 3 of the Act makes certain practices punishable by fine, imprison-
ment, or both. Although introduced as an amendment to Section 2 of the Clay-
ton Act, as finally enacted it is independent thereof, so that for violations of its
provisions the offender is subject only to the penalties just mentioned. Instead
of making the acts prohibited in Section I punishable by fine and imprisonment,
this section defines its own forbidden practices: participating in a sale that to the
participant's knowledge discriminates against competitors of the purchaser;
selling goods at lower prices in one place than elsewhere for the purpose of
destroying competition or eliminating a competitor; and selling goods at unrea-
32. H. R. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 16.
33. H. R. REP. No. 2951, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 7.
34. The person violating the provisions of the Clayton Act is subject to suit for three-
fold damages by the person injured, 38 STAT. 731 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 15 (1927) ; suit for
an injunction by the United States, 38 STAT. 736 (194), 15 U. S. C. A. § 25 (927) ; or by
the person injured, 38 STAT. 737 (1914), 15 U. S. C. A. § 26 (1927) ; or proceedings by the
Federal Trade Comifiission, 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 43 STAT. 939 (1925), 15 U. S. C. A. § 45
(927).
35. 38 STAT. 719 (1914), 43 STAT. 939 (1925), 15 U. S. C. A. §45 (1927).
36. 8o Cong. Rec., May 28, 1936, at 8436. Shortly after the Robinson-Patman Act be-
came effective the Goodyear Company announced that the contract with Sears Roebuck &
Co. had been terminated. N. Y. Times, July 17, 1936, p. 3o, col. 6.
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sonably low prices for the purpose of destroying competition or eliminating a
competitor.
The discrimination mentioned in the first clause is defined to consist in
granting to one purchaser a discount, rebate, allowance or advertising service
charge greater than that available at the same time to competitors of the pur-
chaser buying similar goods of like quantity. No limitation is placed on dis-
criminations based on quantity, a loophole objected to in the Senate debate; 3
on the other hand there is no allowance for differences in the cost of sale due to
different methods. Further, there is no requirement that the prohibited dis-
crimination have the purpose or effect of creating a monopoly or of preventing
competition. Construed literally, and in the light of Section I, this seems to
prohibit only the employment of indirect means of accomplishing a discrimina-
tion in price, as set forth and prohibited in subsections i (d) and I (e), without
prohibiting a discrimination in the basic price itself. On the other hand, by
taking "discount" to include any reduction from the basic price per unit, it might
be construed to prohibit any discrimination not based on quantity, irrespective
of its purpose or effect on the competitive situation, under which construction
it would probably be held unconstitutional, in the light of the Fairmont Cream-
ery case,38 later to be discussed. This difficulty could, however, be overcome
if the section were construed to prohibit only discrimination lessening competition,
somewhat as the Supreme Court construed the Sherman Act's provision against
restraint of trade as prohibiting only undue restraint of trade.39
The prohibition in the second clause against local price cutting differs from
the prohibitions in Section i (a) in that the price cutter's purpose, rather than
the effect on competition, is made the determining factor, so that proof of actual
intent to produce the undesirable results becomes necessary.40  While the first
clause prohibits discrimination against competitors of the buyer, this clause and
the third speak of competitors without qualification, so that they are apparently
intended to refer to competitors of the seller. There is, however, nothing in the
section other than the requirement that the sale be in interstate commerce to
prevent the application of the two latter clauses to the retailer, as well as to the
manufacturer and the distributor, to whom the first clause applies.
The final section of the Act excludes from its provisions the act of a coop-
erative in returning to its members, producers or consumers, their share in the
proceeds of its operations. Cooperatives composed of intermediate distributors
are thus not protected, the Conference Committee having eliminated the words
"or a cooperative wholesale association from returning to its constituent mem-
37. So Cong. Rec., April 29, 1936, at 6596; id., May 28, 1936, at 8439. Senator Borah
recognized this, but said he thought the smaller buyers could overcome it by cooperative
buying.
38. 274 U. S. 1 (1927).
39. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 61 (1911) ; United States v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. lo6, 179 (1911). This construction is open to the objection that
the mere term "discrimination" does not connote an unlawful act, although the expression "re-
straint of trade" at the time of the Anti-Trust Act cases did. That the framers of the present
Act realized this is shown by the qualifications surrounding the term "discrimination" in the
first section. The greater precision used in drafting the first section should not, however,
make it necessary to interpret the third section as if such qualifications had been intentionally
omitted, when it is remembered that the sections represent two entirely different bills, in-
cluded in the same act by an accident of political expediency. That it was not the intention
of the Senate to require a single price to all buyers, irrespective of the effect on competition,
is indicated by the uncontradicted statement of Senator Logan: "That [the Borah-Van Nuys
bill, which he had just read] prohibits the sale in competition for the purpose of destroying
competition or eliminating a competitor in any part of the United States; but as I under-
stand, it allows prices lower than those exacted from other customers unless it is to eliminate
a competitor." 8o Cong. Rec., April 30, 1936, at 667o.
4o. But see United States v. Patten, 226 U. S. 525, 541 (1913).
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bers", which appeared in the Senate bill.41  This would thus not permit chains
to retain, in the form of proportionate rebates, the equivalent of the brokerage
allowances hitherto received, by forming cooperative brokerage houses.
42
Constitutionality
The constitutionality of a statute prohibiting price discrimination must be
tested in the light of two Supreme Court decisions on state acts passed with
that object. In the case of Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota,43 a Minne-
sota statute making unlawful the payment of a higher price, after due allowance
for differences in cost of transportation, etc., in one community than in another,
was held unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court recog-
nized that the purpose of the Act was to prevent the destruction of local cooper-
atives by large buyers; the effect, however, was to freeze prices all over the state
and outlaw all concessions made in the normal course of business, regardless of
purpose or effect. From the Court's statement that "the inhibition of the statute
has no reasonable relation to the anticipated evil" it may be inferred that a
statute whose prohibition was reasonably related to the prevention of the evil
would be proper, an inference strengthened by the fact that in an earlier case
a statute prohibiting discrimination where the effect was to create a monopoly
or to destroy competition was upheld by the Court.44 In Williams v. Standard
Oil Co.,45 a Tennessee statute prohibiting rebates, price concessions and price
discrimination between persons and localities in the sale of gasoline was held a
denial of due process, the property in question not being "affected with a public
interest", and there being nothing in the record to suggest that the practices
prohibited tended to create a monopoly.
The present Act seems to be free of these objections, since it prohibits
discriminations in base prices only when they are made with the purpose or
effect of producing the recognized evils: creation of monopoly, destruction of com-
petition or destruction of a competitor. While the portions prohibiting the
indirect means of discrimination do not contain these qualifications, their validity
may be upheld on the ground that they are in fact ancillary to the basic pro-
hibitions, or that they define unfair trade practices which it is within the power
of Congress to prohibit.
46
The attempted scope of application of Section i (a) is of greater constitu-
tional doubtfulness. Support for the view that the commerce power of Con-
gress extends to the regulation of discrimination in intrastate commerce is
sought in the Shreveport case,47 in which the Supreme Court upheld an order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission raising railroad rates between points
wholly within the state of Texas, where the existing rates discriminated un-
justly in favor of intrastate traffic at the expense of interstate traffic, on the
ground that in pursuance of its power to foster and protect interstate commerce
41. H. R. REP. No. 295i, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 9.
42. To the effect that such cooperatives were contemplated, see Shake-vp in Selling Prac-
tices (June 20, 1936) BUsINESS WEER: 13. Other ways of getting around the Act there sug-
gested were confining sales to buyers of the same class, all large or all small; organizing
separate promotion corporations; establishing buying corporations within the seller's own
state to get an unduly favorable contract wholly within the course of intrastate commerce.
If § I (a) is given the scope its makers intended, however, this last would fall within the pro-
hibition of the act.
43. 274 U. S. I (1927).
44. Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U. S. 157 (912).
45. 278 U. S. 235 (1929).
46. This reasoning would not cover § I (e), since it is by its terms made applicable to all
purchasers, and not simply to those who are competing.
47. Houston, E. & W. Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U. S. 342 (1914).
LEGISLATION
Congress may take all measures necessary and proper to protect that commerce
although intrastate transactions may thereby be controlled.
The Act does not only prohibit discriminations in an intrastate transaction as
a result of which competition with the intrastate buyer by one who buys in the
course of an interstate transaction is made difficult, but also prohibits such
discriminations when they impair competition between one buyer and customers
of the other, or between customers of the buyers. From the tenor of the hear-
ings and the speeches on the floors of both Houses it may be assumed that the
latter provisions were included to outlaw discriminations in favor of chains
as a result of which the chain store gains an advantage over the independent in
the local community. Superficially, at least, this local competition might seem
to be a wholly intrastate matter beyond the power of Congress to regulate. On
the other hand, since under the decision in Baldwin v. Seelig 48 a state could not,
under an act with provisions similar to those of the Robinson-Patman Act,
protect the field of local competition from unfair discrimination having its source
in a transaction in another state, unless there is to be another "no man's land"
in the field of regulation the concept of the commerce power should be extended
to cover this type of situation.
The provision empowering the Federal Trade Commission to fix limits
to quantity discounts raises two problems of constitutionality: first, as to the
power of Congress to fix any such restriction, and second, as to its power to
delegate the fixing of a limit. Since Congress has the power to prevent unjust
discrimination and monopoly in interstate commerce, a fortiori it should be able
to prohibit the means of accomplishing these ends.4 9  And since the question
of when large quantity buyers are so few as to make an otherwise justifiable
quantity discount unjustly discriminatory or promotive of monopoly is one of
fact in each instance, delegation of the duty of determining this to an admin-
istrative body seems not improper under the doctrine of Field v. Clark; 50 fur-
thermore, although the standard by which the Commission is to act is neces-
sarily vague, since the field of its discretion is limited to a single aspect of the
competitive situation, by analogy to the New York Central Securities "' case
it would seem sufficiently definite to be upheld.
A final constitutional problem arises as to the validity of the prohibition
of selling at "unreasonably low prices" for the purpose of destroying competi-
tion or eliminating a competitor, due to the vagueness of the expression quoted;
48. 294 U. S. 511 (1935) (holding unconstitutional as a burden on interstate commerce a
New York statute prohibiting the sale of milk imported from another state unless price paid
in that state is up to minimum prescribed by New York for purchases for local producers).
49. Proponents of the bill pointed to the "similar limitation applied without challenge for
nearly half a century in the field of transportation, in refusing to extend freight rate differ-
entials beyond the car lot quantity", SEN. REP. No. i5o2, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) 6; H.
P. REP. No. 2287, 74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936) IO; and to a dictum in Interstate Commerce
Comm. v. Baltimore & Ohio . R., i45 U. S. 263, 28o (1892), to the effect that even a dis-
count based strictly upon quantity may be an undue preference if only a few of the largest
competitors are able to take advantage of it.
5O. 143 U. S. 649 (1892).
51. New York Central Securities Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 287 U. S. 12
(1932) (provision in Interstate Commerce Act giving Commission power to authorize, when
it considered it in the public interest to do so, the acquisition by one carrier of control of an-
other, on such terms and conditions as it finds to be reasonable in the public interest, held suf-
ficiently definite). In this case, although the standard was vague the field of operation was
narrow; in the Schechter case in determining the sufficiency of the standard the Court was
apparently influenced by the breadth of the area over which the Act was to operate. A. L. A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U. S. 495, 541 (I935).
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under the decisions in United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co. 52 and Cline v.
Frink Dairy Co.5 it would seem to be invalid.
Assuming that it clears the constitutional hurdles it is difficult to surmise
what effect the Act will have on business practices. It will undoubtedly force
an analysis of the costs of selling to various types of customers, an analysis that
may in certain instances adversely affect the small as well as the large buyer.
Since it does not deprive the large buyer of any savings to which he is justly
entitled, except where a quantity limit may be imposed, it should not encourage
the formation of vertical trusts, as sometimes suggested,5 5 unless through a fear
of violating the Act a seller will not give a buyer the discount to which the quan-
tity of his purchase entitles him.56 And if the retailers favored by the Act pass
on to their customers the lower prices which they should be able to get as a
result of the equalization of allowances, the consequent increase in their pur-
chasing power should, in the long run, make up for the predicted loss in the
purchasing power of the customers of the beneficiaries of the now forbidden
excessive discounts.
I. N. S., Jr.
52. 255 U. S. 8I (192) (statute punishing by fine and imprisonment "any unjust or un-
reasonable rate or charge in handling or dealing in or with any necessaries" held unconstitu-
tional as setting up no ascertainable standard of guilt).
53. 274 U. S. 445 (1927) (statute punishing conspiracies in restraint of trade, etc., except
when necessary in order to enable participants to obtain a reasonable profit from products
dealt in held void, latter provision leaving it without a fixed standard of guilt).
54. The Federal Trade Commission has issued complaints, in addition to the one men-
tioned in note 21, supra, in five cases involving the rate structures of three sellers. (1936) 4
U. S. L. WEEK 97. Complaints against Bird & Son, Inc., Bird Floor Covering Sales Corp.,
and Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc., charge the first two with violating § I (a) and the third
in violating § (I) (f) in the granting and receiving, respectively, of substantially lower prices
than were charged to competing retailers for the same goods. For rugs sold to Ward's @
$3.64 in carload lots and @ $3.82 in smaller lots to Ward's retail stores competing retailers
were charged $4.24 in lots of IOO rolls or more, and $4.85 in lots of 15 or less. Hearings were
held on December 7, 1936.
Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp. was cited for violating § i (a) in connection with the follow-
ing price structure: (i) sales of cheese in 5 lb. boxes were divided into the following quan-
tity groups: 5-29 lbs., 30-149 lbs., 15o-749 lbs., 750 lbs. up. In each group Kraft allowed a
one cent per pound discount from the unit price charged in the immediately preceding smaller
group; (2) in connection with sales of other products, (a) a 5% discount was allowed in
purchases of $5 or more involving only one delivery, and (b) a 5% discount was allowed to
all group purchasers contracting for $IOO or more per week, where store-door delivery is
made and only one billing is required.
Shefford Cheese Co., Inc., was cited for having the same general price structure; in addi-
tion it allowed a 15% discount on all purchases in excess of $ioo per week. Test for Patinan
Act (Oct. 8, 1936) 177 PRINTERS' INK 89.
More recently, complaints have been issued against sellers charged with discrimination
in the furnishing of demonstrators paid by the seller, and in the allowance of "push money"
commissions to employees of the buyer on their sales of the seller's product. 4 U. S. L.
WEEK 249 (1936).
55. N. Y. Times, June 22, 1936, p. 18, col. 2.
56. Although the sections requiring allowances to be granted on a proportional basis
work up as well as down, i. e., a large buyer could claim an increased allowance on the ground
that his smaller competitors are getting more than their proportionate share, the section pro-
hibiting discriminations in basic price does not require differentials to be given in accordance
with economies resulting from different methods of sale, quantity, etc., but says simply that if
given they must not exceed those savings.
To get around the difficult cost-accounting problem of determining the difference in the
costs of selling to large chains and smaller sellers the U. S. Rubber Co. is reported to be
forming a subsidiary, U. S. Tire Dealers Mutual Co., which will purchase tires from the
parent company on the same footing as the large buyers and handle the distribution to the
smaller dealers, to whom all distribution profits will be passed on. (Dec. 14, 1936) 28 TnsE
86.
